A growing list of papers, articles, and studies on organizations and culture:
The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. “We identify three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs, each of which can be associated with a different source of legitimacy: coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization." Regarding mimetic isomorphism specifically: "When organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations."
Interdependencies among Elements Organizational Design. “We examine how and why elements of organizational design depend on one another. An agent-based simulation allows us to model three design elements and two contextual variables that have rarely been analyzed jointly: a vertical hierarchy that reviews proposals from subordinates, an incentive system that rewards subordinates for departmental or firm-wide performance, the decomposition of an organization's many decisions into departments, the underlying pattern of interactions among decisions, and limits on the ability of managers to process information. Interdependencies arise among these features because of a basic, general tension. To be successful, an organization must broadly search for good sets of decisions, but it must also stabilize around good decisions once discovered. An effective organization balances search and stability.”
Revisiting the norm of normality of individual performance. "Across all studies, results were remarkably consistent: individual performance is not normally distributed. Instead, it follows a Paretian (power law) distribution... Approximately 20% of individuals accounted for over 50% of the output across all samples, whereas the 'vital few' (top 5%) accounted for 20% of the output." (See also: Star Performers in Twenty-First Century Organizations)
Star Analysts’ Performance and the Portability of Human Capital. “Past research is clear on the benefits of high-performing, or "star," workers. Star computer programmers, for example, are more productive than average ones by a ratio of eight to one. But reaping the benefits of such talent is not so simple. Say you hire a number of stars. How can you guarantee that they will be able to replicate their success in a new environment -in short, how portable are they? […] Organizations should not think of talent management as a simple "build versus buy" dichotomy. Rather, there are some positions for which they can buy, and others for which they must build. Within investment banks, for example, the retail brokers (who handle individual clients) work primarily on their own. In contrast, institutional salespeople (who sell to major institutional investors such as Putnam, Vanguard and Fidelity) are more likely to perform their jobs in teams. […] The authors' research should help companies recognize that an entire class of factors - specific roles within an organization - greatly determines the portability of performance. With that knowledge, executives can gain a deeper understanding of the pros and cons of hiring certain star employees.”
Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action. "It is commonly expected that individuals will reverse decisions or change behaviors which result in negative consequences. Yet, within investment decision contexts, negative consequences may actually cause decision makers to increase the commitment of resources and undergo the risk of further negative consequences. The research presented here examined this process of escalating commitment through the simulation of a business investment decision. Specifically, 240 business school students participated in a role-playing exercise in which personal responsibility and decision consequences were the manipulated independent variables. Results showed that persons committed the greatest amount of resources to a previously chosen course of action when they were personally responsible for negative consequences."
Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers. “Theorists in various fields have discussed characteristics of top managers. This paper attempts to synthesize these previously fragmented literatures around a more general "upper echelons perspective." The theory states that organizational outcomes-strategic choices and performance levels-are partially predicted by managerial background characteristics. Propositions and methodological suggestions are included.”
Lift outs: how to acquire a high-functioning team. “More and more, expanding companies are hiring high-functioning groups of people who have been working together effectively within one company and can rapidly come up to speed in a new environment. These lifted-out teams don't need to get acquainted with one another or to establish shared values, mutual accountability, or group norms; their long-standing relationships and trust help them make an impact very quickly. Of course, the process is not without risks: A failed lift out can lead to loss of money, opportunity, credibility, and even native talent. Boris Groysberg and Robin Abrahams studied more than 40 high-profile moves and interviewed team leaders in multiple industries and countries to examine the risks and opportunities that lift outs present.”
On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B. “Whether dealing with monkeys, rats, or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that most organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded. The extent to which this occurs of course will depend on the perceived attractiveness of the rewards offered, but neither operant nor expectancy theorists would quarrel with the essence of this notion. Nevertheless, numerous examples exist of reward systems that are fouled up in that behaviors which are rewarded are those which the rewarder is trying to discourage, while the behavior he desires is not being rewarded at all. In an effort to understand and explain this phenomenon, this paper presents examples from society, from organizations in general, and from profit making firms in particular.”
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. “Relational contracts-informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships-are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and net-works, and for the role of management within and between firms.”